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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: URANIUM MINING ON THE
NAVAJO RESERVATION
Becky J. Miles Viers
A nation within a nation, the Navajo Reservation occupies 12.5
million acres' and spreads across three state boundary lines into
Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.2 Rich in uranium necessary to
the economy of the surrounding United States, 3 the Navajo
Reservation is thus open to the evils of exploitation. The problem
is highlighted in this passage from a report by the Commission on
Civil Rights:
If the tribe foregoes opportunities for mineral exploitation, it
foregoes the chance for immediate income. Yet, it must have
this income to operate that which, because of the reservation's
general underdevelopment coupled with other historical fac-
tors, is a welfare economy. Exploitation of these resources,
however, is a short term answer because of the depletion fac-
tor. The reservation's mineral resources are given a predicted
maximum depletion span of 35 years. The pertinent questions
are what kind of life and what kind of land will be left after
these resources have been exploited.'
If exploitation of uranium is permitted and left uncontrolled
on the Navajo Reservation, the harsh effects of it could be
devastating. Radon, an inert radioactive gas, is produced during
uranium mining. Upon exposure to the atmosphere, this gas
decays into a series of radioactive isotopes.' Along with im-"
mediate danger to the environment, through these atmospheric
pollutants, uranium mining could possibly result in the destruc-
tion of the surface lands around the mines. Presently most
uranium mining is conducted underground, but as with coal, as
the demand for uranium increases, surface mining may become
more commonplace. In the past, such surface mining has been
conducted with little or no regard for the continued productivity
of the land.'
1. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, "The Navajo Nation: An American Col-
ony." Pub. L. No. 85-315 (1975) at 20 [hereinafter cited as U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS
REPORT].
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id. at 20.
4. Id. at 24.
5. Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 560 (10th Cir. 1977).
6. United States v. Richardson, 559 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979). This case involved the
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The uranium mining processes on the reservation, if left un-
supervised, may leave scars not only on the land but upon the
people themselves. The relationship of the Navajo people to their
land is much stronger than most Anglo-Americans comprehend. 7
The livelihood of the Navajo is centered around cattle and
sheep.' Without the necessary grazing lands, these sources of
food supply would diminish or possibly disappear. The exploita-
tion of minerals unnecessarily destroys a lot of the required graz-
ing area.
The mining operations are not of themselves the sole cause of
the dilemma facing the Navajo Nation. Both coal and uranium
are necessary resources for the continued economic growth of the
United States. The royalties returned to the Navajos from these
mining operations are essential to their existence on the reserva-
tion.8 In time, however, the royalties from the mining operations
will become less as the minerals themselves are drained from the
land. The Indians will not only be left with land worthless for
grazing their food supplying livestock, but with land also worth-
less as a source of income from royalties.' 0
The answer to this complex problem cannot be found in the
elimination of the mining leases. Rather, environmental protec-
tion laws must be implemented to insure the continued existence
use of blasting and bulldozing in the exploration and prospecting of claims on National
Forest lands. The court held that such uses were destructive to surface resources and were
not a reasonable method of exposing and prospecting claims. In footnote 5, page 294, the
court noted the quoted testimony by Bureau of Land Management Director Woozley to
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs concerning Senate Bill 1713: "Under pre-
sent uses, I feel very definitely that some people are taking advantage of using the surface
rights for purposes not incident actually to mining ....
"I think your bulldozer examples out in New Mexico and probably in Arizona and
Colorado and Wyoming, in the exploration for uranium, is one very good example."
7. Goodman & Thompson, The Hopi-Navajo Land Disputes, 3 Am. INDIAN L. REV.
397, 412 (1975). "To the Indian, and more particularly to the Navajo, land represents
something which is sacred-something which does not have a value in terms of dollars
and cents." Statement by Otto L. Bendheim, M.D., Hearings before Comm. on Interior
& Insular Affairs. S. Rep., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 233-27 (1972).
8. [d. at 410. This article directly indicates not only that livestock is important for
the supply of food, but that it is also the Navajo's "concept of wealth and poverty." To
deprive the Navajos of the land needed for livestock herd growth is to deprive them of
both a food supply and an economic status, a capitalistic concept fundamental to
Americam society.
9. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note I, at 24.
10. Goodman & Thompson, The Hopi-Navajo Land Disputes, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
397, 410-15 (1975). The surface land used by the Navajo for cattle and sheep grazing is
already overburdened. To reduce the surface area by destructive mining is to reduce the
size of the herds.
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of the grazing lands of the Navajo Nation even after the raw
mineral wealth has been depleted.
The relationships between the Navajo Nation, the federal
government, individual tribal members, and the mineral leasee
make environmental protection on reservation lands even more
complex than similar protection on non-Indian lands. While state
environmental protection laws add yet another facet to analysis
of this problem, they will not be considered in this discussion. In-
stead, the emphasis will be on the tripod of tribal, federal, and
individual tribal member concerns. Each leg of this tripod has a
distinct and separate interest in any uranium mining permit
granted on Navajo Nation land. The Navajo Tribe has mining
permit guidelines set under its Tribal Code to protect its
interests." In a broader scope, the federal government has
enacted environmental protection legislation, as well as mining
regulations, to safeguard federal interests in environmental con-
trol. Only the individual tribal member is without recourse
against violations by uranium miners. Federal legislation and the
Navajo Code appear to contain sufficient safeguards of the in-
terests of the Navajo Nation. Closer scrutiny, however, makes it
apparent that these protected interests are not necessarily the
same as those of individual tribal members. It is also apparent
that some action other than that presently in force is required to
protect these individual interests.
Navajo Tribal Council Mining Lease Approval
as Environmental Protection
In order to obtain a mining lease, the prospective contractor
must first gain approval by the Tribal Office of Energy
Resources. From this office, the lease application goes to the
following: the chairman of the Tribal Council, the Branch of
Realty, the general superintendent, the area director, and finally
to the Secretary of the Interior.'" The exact number of offices
11. Navajo Tribal Code tit. 18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as N.T.C.].
12. Id. § 801:
"(a) Mining leases, including the conversion of an assignment of a mining permit to
a lease, shall originate with the Office of Energy Resources. Upon obtaining approval
from the office, the leases shall be forwarded to the office of the Chairman of the
Tribal Council.
"(b) Upon obtaining approval of the office of the Chairman, the leases shall be for-
warded to the Branch of Realty.
"(c) Upon obtaining clearance from the Branch of Realty, the leases shall be for-
warded through the office of the General Superintendent to the Area Director for ap-
19791 NOTES
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that must approve the lease depends directly on the area of land
to be covered in the mining permit. With so many tribal and
governmental departments required to approve a mining lease,
obviously each lease is scrutinized carefully. Such a complex pro-
cess of tribal investigation into each lease would appear to be in
keeping with concern for the individual Navajo's interests.
However, this bureaucratic approval of leases from the tribal
agencies to the Secretary of the Interior involves several major
obstacles to protection of the Navajo environment. The first such
obstacle is in the Tribal Council approval stage. The Tribal
Council, organized in 1938, was fashioned after the Anglo model
of government.1 3 The Anglo-American concept of a centralized
governing body is alien to the Navajo tradition.' 4 When the
Tribal Council approves a lease for mining purposes, it does so
under the authority given it by a congressional act, not necessarily
by authority given it by tribal members.
Furthermore, individual tribal members have no available
remedy from outside courts in cancelling leases that have been
approved by the Tribal Council. The concepts of tribal im-
munity1 5 and indispensable parties 6 work together to eliminate
the handling of such suits by federal courts. If individual
members wish to bring suit to cancel any lease which is a danger
to their environment, they must join the Tribal Council, and due
to the immunity of the council from such suit, this is impossible.
The individual Navajo is forced to deal with a tribal governmen-
tal system which is Anglo in nature and which may not reflect the
traditional values and concerns. If a conflict arises between the
individual Navajo and the Tribal Council, there is no available
judicial forum in which to raise this challenge.
proval.
"(d) Upon approval by the Area Director the leases shall be returned to the Branch
of Realty for final disposition."
§ 802: "Mining leases... for tracts not less than 40 acres ... shall be negotiated through
the Advisory Committee of the Tribal Council and the Area Director, subject to approval
of the Secretary of the Interior or his authorized representative; . ..
13. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 17-19.
14. Id.
15. Cherokee Nation v. Oklahoma, 461 F.2d 674, 681 (10th Cir. 1972). The tribe may
not be sued by the tribal members without its consent. The concept here is in direct rela-
tion to that of the sovereign immunity of the United States.
16. Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977); Tewa Tesuque v. Morton,
498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974). The tribe is considered an indispensable party under
Federal Rule 19(B), in any action requesting cancellation of a lease approved by the tribe.
[Vol.7
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NOTES
Another factor in the evaluation of Tribal Council approval in-
volves the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), The Advisory Com-
mittee sets the agenda for the Tribal Council, including in this
agenda BIA proposals for mining leases.' 7 These BIA-approved
leases are often not in the best interests of the tribe, or are not
carried to completion by the leasee.18 However, any changes in
the leases made by the council, such as requirements for stronger
environmental protections, must be returned to the BIA for ap-
proval and could thereby be delayed for a burdensome amount of
time. I I
Perhaps the most significant drawback to the effectiveness of
the plan is that the Tribal Council is protecting its tribal interest
by this mine lease approval procedure and not the individual in-
terests of tribal members. Even on the face of the Tribal Code, it
appears that the primary tribal interest is the short-term interest
in providing immediate income from the much needed uranium
royalties rather than the long-term interest of sufficient en-
vironmental protection which would require reclamation efforts
by the leasee to insure productivity of the land when the minerals
are gone.2 0 Both interests are vital to survival of the tribe, but
only the latter will allow survival for more than thirty years. As
well, only the latter will insure survival of the Navajo's tradi-
tional livestock-based lifestyle.
Federal Legislation for Environmental Protection
This bureaucratic string of approvals is not the sole safeguard
of the reservation's interests. The federal government, in its con-
cern for national environmental protection, has included the
Indian nations under its National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). NEPA requires federal agencies to consider the effect
on the environment together with economic and technical factors
17. 18 N.T.C. tit. 18, § 802 (1977).
18. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
19. Id. at 8-11.
20. 18 N.T.C. tit. 18, § 803 (1977). The term for a lease for a uranium mine is limited
to two years and continues as long as uranium is produced in paying quantities. Other
leases have a term of ten years. Navajo Tribal Code tit. 18, § 1202 (1977). This section
regulates coal production, concerning itself with royalties as well as lease control. No
similar sample lease is provided in the Code for uranium mining. This is indicative of two
problems. First, that uranium mining is not as closely supervised as is coal mining, and
second, that uranium mining environmental control is not specifically detailed in the
Navajo Tribal Code. However, royalty payment of uranium mine leases is codified at 18
N.T.C. § 852.
19791
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in their decision making." Whenever an agency proposes a major
action that will affect the environment, an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) must be prepared to determine the effects of the
action on the people, the wildlife, and the land in the vicinity of
the action. The decision-making body must then take into con-
side:ration this EIS before making final determination of the pro-
ject presented for its approval.22
In Davis v. Morton,23 non-Indian plaintiffs sought cancellation
of a mining lease for its failure to meet NEPA requirements. The
Tenth Circuit agreed that the mining leases enacted on reserva-
tion property fell within NEPA. This 1972 decision determined
that NEPA requirements applied to the actions of the Secretary of
the Interior in approving mining leases on Indian reservations.2 '
Therefore, an EIS must be prepared before any uranium leases are
presented to the secretary, and the EIS must be considered by the
secretary as part of his final determination as to authorization of
the lease.
Enforcement of NEPA, however, has certain drawbacks
relative to the Navajo people and their land. Actions brought to
protect the environment as a result of the enactment of NEPA
are generally initiated by persons outside the reservation bound-
aries.2" This leads to interference from people alien to the
economic concerns of the Navajo. Both economic and en-
vironmental interests must be protected or the Navajo Nation
could possibly lose much needed royalty income by cancellation
of leases in order to protect the environment. The alternative of
stricter enforcement of environmental protection regulations is
often overlooked by outsiders.
In addition to outsiders, Navajo tribal members also have
taken the initiative to enforce the NEPA. In a suit subsequent to
21. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1979).
22. Id. at § 4332(C).
23, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
24, Id. at 596-98.
25. See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972), and Cady v. Morton, 527
F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1975). The tribes have entered into some actions to enforce NEPA, but
they are not an indispensable party where enforcement of NEPA is the purpose of the
suit. "Dismissal of the action for nonjoinder of the Tribe would produce an anomalous
result. No one, except the Tribe, could seek review of an environmental impact statement
covering significant federal action relating to leases or agreements for development of
natural resource on Indian lands. NEPA is concerned with national environmental in-
terests. Tribal interests may not coincide with national interests. We find nothing in
NEPA which excepts Indian lands from national environmental policy." Manygoats v.
Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 559 (10th Cir. 1977).
[Vol.7
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Davis v. Morton concerning the same lease, individual tribal
members sought the identical remedy of cancellation on the same
basis as in Davis and were denied relief. 26 Relief was denied, first,
because the question of violations of NEPA had been rendered
moot by the earlier Davis decision. Second, and more devastating
to the cause of the tribal members, was the requirement that the
Tribal Council be joined as an indispensable party without which
the court could not continue. Immunity doctrines would not per-
mit this joinder and the tribal members were left without judicial
recourse. 27
The Tenth Circuit has not always determined the Tribal Coun-
cil to be an indispensable party in actions initiated by tribal
members. In Manygoats v. Kleppe, a 1977 case, the court found
joinder of the Tribal Council to be necessary, but continued
determination of the issues without joinder as authorized under
Federal Code of Civil Procedure Rule 19.28 In Manygoats, tribal
members did not seek the cancellation of a lease, but rather en-
joinment of performance until there was compliance with NEPA.
The court reaffirmed its earlier decision that cancellation of a
mining lease is impossible without joinder of the council but
found enjoinment of performance to be a permissible remedy
available without joinder. The decision in Manygoats at last
opened the door for tribal members to request, individually, en-
vironmental protection under NEPA.
However, the fact remains that although federal environmental
laws may be available for implementation by the Navajo people
as individuals, these laws are designed to protect federal interests,
not Indian interests. An individual Navajo, such as Manygoats,
may demand the issuance of an EIS, but the contents of that EIS
are not at the discretion of that individual.29
NEPA provides the guidelines for compiling an EIS.30 The
Secretary of the Interior is one of the agents whose guidance
26. Tewa Tesuque v. Morton, 498 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1974).
27. See also Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1975).
28. 558 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1977).
29. The NEPA regulations will only be effective for use by the individual Indians
when they are permitted enjoinment of a mining lease. Where the individuals have been
permitted to bring the suit without joinder of the tribe only to demand an EIS, an impor-
tant link is missing. That link is the ability of the Indian to bypass the tribe and attack the
leasee for noncompliance with what that individual or group of individuals may feel is a
fundamental environmental need.
30. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1979).
1979]
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should be sought in preparing an EIS.3' In this sense, the
secretary acts in a dual capacity. He acts "in a quasi-judicial
capacity in acting upon the recommendations of the superinten-
dent and the actions of the tribal council regarding these
leases,' '32 as well as acting in an advisory capacity for preparing
an EIS. The secretary may act to protect the economic interests
of the tribe, or the environmental interests directed to him under
the NEPA. Any conflict in these interests places the secretary in a
discretionary position." When one adds to this conflict the
Secretary of the Interior's duty to protect the interest of a nation
fraught with energy problems of its own, it becomes apparent
that the pleas of one individual tribal member for grazing land
may well go unheeded even if included in an EIS.
A second important aspect in considering NEPA as a feasible
means of protecting Navajo interests is that the EIS required by
the court in Manygoats did not include evaluation of protection
of the surface from uranium mining processes.34 The court
reasoned that the mining of uranium is primarily conducted
underground. 3 This unquestionably does not take into considera-
tion future depletion of the uranium to the point that extraction
of the lesser quality minerals will necessitate surface mining.
Also, it ignores the damage that is done to the surface of any
mining area where strict environmental protection is not im-
plemented.3 6
One other possible safeguard initiated by federal legislation
deserves analysis. This is the Omnibus Tribal Leasing Act of
1969, 3 and policy statements by the secretary in regard to this
Act. 38 The Act was implemented to protect environmental stand-
31. Id.
32. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 104 (1942).
33. Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (1977): "the duties and responsibilities of
the Secretary may conflict with the interests of the Tribe. The Secretary must act in ac-
cord with obligations imposed by NEPA. In acting upon the Navajo-Exxon agreement the
Secretary, to further the national objectives declared by NEPA, must have and consider an
EIS. The national interest is not necessarily coincidental with the interest of the Tribe.. .."
34. Id. at 560. The court recognized the EIS did not extensively cover the surface min-
ing environmental dangers, but excused this deletion. The court earlier in its decision
discussed the regulatory controls which would govern any surface mining, thus apparently
shifting the burden of control of surface destruction from the EIS to mining regulations.
Id. at 559.
35. Id.
36. See note 6 supra.
37. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1979).
38. 25 C.F.R. § 177.1 (1979).
[Vol.7
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ards in mining processes upon reservation lands. The policy state-
ments require a plan for reconstruction to be provided before any
mining operation begins.39 This Act is not substantive and pro-
cedural as is NEPA, however. It merely provides guidelines for
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in its decision making as to approval
of mining permits.4" In addition, the Act pertains primarily to
reclamation procedures for surface mining. Since most uranium
fields begin as underground operations, the Omnibus Act would
not be applicable to the original lease.'"
The Omnibus Act is barred from being a workable alternative
for protection of the environment for a second reason. The policy
statements accompanying the Act require a plan for reclamation
to be accompanied with at least a $2,000 bond by the
contractor. 2 Failure to comply with the plan may subject the
leasee to cancellation of his lease and forfeiture of the bond.4 3
This $2,000 is a minute amount in comparison to the possible
tremendous cost of reclamation.
An Alternative to the Present Plans
Examination 'of tribal and federal legislative methods of
safeguarding Navajo Reservation lands from irreparable damage
from uranium mine development leads to a determination that no
plan thus far enacted has been completely successful as far as the
interests of individual Navajo ranchers are concerned.
A possibility for protecting reclamation interests and providing
environmental protection of Navajo lands has been suggested by
the tribe itself and could possibly provide the best alternative to
exploitation. This suggestion by the tribe would include the for-
39. Id. "Interest of the Indian owners and the public at large requires that, with
respect to the exploration for, and the surface mining of, such minerals, adequate
measures be taken to avoid, minimize, or correct damage to the environment-land,
water, and air-and to avoid, minimize, or correct hazards to the public health and safety."
40. Anderson, Strip Mining on Reservation Lands: Protecting the Environment and
the Rights of Indian Allotment Owners, 35 MoNTANA L. REv. 209, 216-20 (1974).
41. Similar problems exist in other legislation passed by Congress such as the Surface
Control and Mining Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1300, or the Mineral Leasing
Act, 30 U.S.C. § 187, which direct coverage of surface mining reclamation to coal min-
ing. In particular, see 30 U.S.C. § 1201: "Congress finds and declares that ... (i) while
there is a need to regulate surface mining operations for minerals other than coal, more
data and analysis are needed to serve as a basis for effective and reasonable regulation of
such operations; ... "
42. 25 C.F.R. § 177.8 (1979).
43. Id. at § 177.10.
1979]
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mation of a partnership or joint venture with the uranium field
developers and the Navajo Nation itself." The obvious deterrent
to this simple and feasible alternative is that such self-
determination by the Navajo Tribe has not yet been achieved in
the area of mineral development.
Conclusion
Numerous actions have been taken to assure environmental
protection of surface lands on the Navajo Reservation, while pro-
viding needed uranium resources to the United States and mineral
royalties to the Navajo Nation. However, these steps have not
been totally effective in assuring the individual tribal members the
continued productivity of their grazing lands after depletion of
the mineral.
The provisions provided in the Navajo Code are not necessarily
reflective of the desires of the Navajo tribal members. Yet royalty
payments for uranium mining are necessary for survival of the
tribe under present conditions, but such survival appears to be
limited to the amounts of the minable minerals themselves.
Environmental protection through enforcement of NEPA
removes the determination of the effectiveness of these measures
from the tribe and places it with the Secretary of the Interior,
who acts not only to protect the Navajos' interests but the in-
terests of the United States as well. The Omnibus Mining Lease
Act protects reclamation interests, but often only to a limit of
$2,000 and does little to eliminate the environmental dangers
from mining uranium. The tribe's proposal for partnership
agreements with the uranium developers is perhaps the only feasi-
ble protective device. If the tribe is making more than a mere
royalty from the reservation's uranium deposits, it is more
reasonable to believe that the tribe can afford to concern itself
with reconstruction of the land in order to provide the environ-
ment necessary for the Navajo traditional form of life to con-
tinue.
44. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 1, at 132-33. Recommendation
of the Commission, which was made aware of the difficulty between the need for en-
vironmental control and continued royalties from uranium mining: "The Department of
the Interior should adopt a policy in favor of joint enterprises-on a 50-50 basis-be-
tween the tribe and corporations wishing to conduct business on the reservation."
[Vol.7
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